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crucial role in efficient company functioning and shareholder protection, and 
consequently positively impact valuation. We find little valuation impact from corporate 
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corporate governance is to protect external financiers.  
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d1.  Introduction  
In this paper, we investigate the impact of country legal regimes and company 
corporate governance practices on company performance using a cross-country 
framework. Corporate governance is nowadays a widely used concept with many 
studies of country legal regimes and company-specific corporate governance practices 
and structures. These studies have highlighted some aspects of legal regimes and main 
corporate governance practices that are associated with improved company 
performance and explored the channels through which corporate governance may 
affect performance. Although both legal regimes and company practices have been 
found to matter in corporate governance, by how much each does and the interaction 
between legal regimes and company practices has not much been researched to date.  
In this paper, by using data on practices for companies from different legal regimes, 
we investigate not only the impact of country rules and detailed company-level 
practices on company valuation but also the degree of substitutability or 
complementarity between rules and practices in terms of their effect on company 
valuation.  We find that the valuation impact of company corporate governance 
practices varies by legal systems. In particular, we find evidence of overregulation 
when a company already has good corporate governance practices. 
The importance of corporate governance has been well established in recent years. 
Corporate governance can reduce agency problems among shareholders and between 
managers and shareholders, limiting private benefits and expropriation by controlling 
owners.  Better corporate governance also means better monitoring of management, 
which can translate into higher company performance. Much evidence supports these 
two channels (see Dennis and McConnell, 2003; and Claessens, 2006, for recent 
reviews). Typically though this empirical literature has investigated corporate 
governance from either a country or a company point of view.  In their widely cited 
papers, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000, henceforth LLSV) show that higher investor 
protection at the country level is associated with greater access to finance, more 
capital market development, and higher company valuation. Starting with Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003), a large number of studies have investigated how different 
corporate governance practices at the company level within a single country affect 
shareholders, bondholders and investors and more generally company behavior and 
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corporate governance aspects most important for company behavior and valuation. 
Studying, however, in one framework country level corporate governance regimes 
and company corporate governance practices can be important for several reasons.  
For one, companies’ specific corporate governance choices have to be considered in 
light of the corporate governance regime in the specific country. Take two similar 
companies implementing exactly the same governance practices but located in two 
different countries. Identical corporate governance practices may be valued differently 
by investors depending on whether they are required or voluntarily adopted. Also 
shareholders may consider some aspects of the legal regime in one country as 
substitutes to the same corporate governance practices used in another country. Or 
shareholders may prefer to invest in companies whose country of incorporation 
guarantees better protection in the eventuality of legal disputes, irrespective of the 
company corporate governance practices. Correspondingly, shareholders may value 
corporate governance practices differently depending on the legal regime in the 
country. Second, corporate governance practices are not independent of the legal 
regime and vice-versa.  Given current laws, a company may not have a 
choice⎯except to incorporate in another jurisdiction⎯but to adjust its corporate 
governance practices. This discussion makes clear that both the strength of country 
protection and companies’ corporate governance practices are aspects to account for 
when studying the impact of corporate governance of companies. Only by taking both 
rules and practices into account, can we hope to detect which practices affect 
performance, the degree of complementarity or substitutability between practices and 
legal regimes, and the overall magnitude of impacts of practices and legal regimes on 
performance.  
Doing such an analysis can be complex though. In a single-country context, 
company-level studies can focus on those few corporate governance aspects salient 
for the particular country. In a cross-country setting, the variety in corporate 
governance practices increases. Also given differences in legal regimes and 
consequent requirements, it becomes more important to capture as many corporate 
governance aspects as possible, but this is difficult due to the lack of a comprehensive 
  2coverage of sufficient aspects of corporate governance practices.
1 The fact that studies 
for different countries looking at the association between board independence and 
performance have found contradictory results (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) 
may be related to the lack of comparable data.  Several of the cross-country studies 
have had to resort to using a broad measure of corporate governance (e.g., in the form 
of an index covering aspects of transparency, independence, accountability, social 
responsibility and discipline in one number). This does not allow one to study 
individual corporate governance practices, which can be an important omission. For 
US companies, for example, Bebchuk et al. (2004) find that not everything matters 
equally for performance, and that associations between a broad index and 
performance may be driven by only few aspects.    
More generally, with more details on corporate governance practices one can 
answer specific questions like: Is it more important to have an independent board or to 
leave more monitoring powers to shareholders? Is greater transparency beneficial to 
shareholders? How do these aspects depend on the local legal regimes? Are there 
interactions between certain aspects of legal regimes and corporate governance 
practices in terms of company performance? Furthermore, using more detailed data 
one can investigate interactions between corporate governance and (access to) 
external financing. Corporate governance has been found to help relax external 
financing constraints by alleviating signaling problems and ensuring managers exert 
efforts on value-maximizing projects and do not expropriate private benefits.   
Whether these results hold across countries and how they depend on specific 
corporate governance regimes and practices is subject to study. 
 
The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) dataset provides us with a unique 
opportunity to investigate the interaction between performance and the corporate 
governance regime at the country and company’s level in a cross-country framework.
2 
The coverage of companies and countries is quite wide, approximately 5300 US 
companies and 2400 non-US companies from 22 advanced economies for the period 
2003 – 2005.  In contrast to many existing empirical studies using only a broad 
                                                 
1 For instance, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) cover only the presence of anti-takeover provisions 
(ATPs) in companies’ charters, thus potentially ignoring other important governance practices. 
2 Two studies also using ISS data, but done independently are Arel, Aggarwal, Stulz and Williamson 
(2007) and Chhaochharia and Laeven (2007). 
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provides individual corporate governance practices of each company. It covers, 
among others, information on the composition and independence of boards and 
committees, the level of shareholders’ involvement in the company’s decisions, and 
relations with the auditors. For a cross-country analysis, it will also be important to 
cover in detail the countries’ institutional environment, especially the different legal 
frameworks and other various aspects possibly affecting the impact of corporate 
governance practices. Fortunately, much progress has been made in recent years to 
document aspects of countries’ legal regimes, and we draw on this literature.  
 
Using these data, we find that across the 23 countries two corporate governance 
practices are positively and significantly associated with performance: the degree of 
board independence, and the existence and independence of board committees. Also, 
absence of entrenched boards and higher investor protection at the country level are 
positively associated with performance, but this evidence is not robust under all 
specifications. The corporate governance channels are found to be stronger for 
companies in highly financial dependent industries. We also find evidence that strong 
corporate governance practices pay off less for small companies, maybe because 
strong corporate governance practices involve costs in terms of monitoring, time and 
resources which offset the benefits.  
 
Importantly, we find interaction effects between the strength of legal protection 
and the companies’ corporate governance practices. In particular, we find that country 
level investor protection matters little when companies have weak corporate 
governance practices, suggesting that country legal protection cannot substitute for 
weak company corporate governance practices. In contrast, for corporations with 
strong corporate governance practices, excessive country regulation can harm 
valuation, consistent with a hypothesis that excessive regulation can harm managerial 
initiatives and lead to lower return and valuation. This finding has important 
consequences from a regulatory viewpoint.  If high corporate governance practices in 
the form of strong, independent, and pro-shareholder boards are already in place, as 
  4for the average US company, there may be a cost of increasing regulatory burdens.
3 
On the contrary, if companies of a specific country tend to adopt weak corporate 
governance practices, regulatory intervention may be of little value. This is the case, 
for instance, for Italian and Belgian companies, which rank well below the overall 
sample mean for level of board entrenchment and independence, or existence and 
independence of board committees. Of course, this is not to say that no forms of 
government rules or interventions are useful in these countries and for these types of 
corporations. Our conclusion has to remain limited to the type of regulatory 
intervention captured in our index of legal regimes.  But, our finding does suggest that 
regulations need to be well-designed and that there can be cost from overregulation. 
 
We contribute to the literature in methodological aspect by using detailed panel 
data on companies’ corporate governance practices, which means we can be less 
concerned about reverse causality driving our results. Using detailed aspects of 
corporate governance, we can also disentangle the channels through which corporate 
governance acts. Furthermore, our results are robust to the inclusion of different 
control variables, using different statistic techniques and using several performance 
variables (Tobin’s Q and ROA). Besides these, we also add in methodological aspects 
by analyzing the role of company external financing needs and size without 
introducing endogeneity problems. We show that corporate governance acts 
especially as a bonding-monitoring-discipline device for those companies that can 
expect to require more external financing by applying the Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
methodology of identifying industries that heavily rely on external financing.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.   
Section 3 describes corporate governance indicators and the main financial data used 
in the analysis, and the empirical methodology employed. Section 4 discusses the 
results and section 5 concludes. 
 
                                                 
3 This is in line with the increasing debate among academics, politicians, and practitioners about the 
negative effects of the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Law. 
  52. Literature 
We are interested in disentangling various aspects of corporate governance, inter-
relating these aspects with country-specific measures of legal investor protection and 
studying their association with performance. Such analysis can teach us whether the 
implementation of certain corporate governance practices and legal requirements is 
reflected in higher company valuation and better performance in all countries. The 
(US) based evidence supports that (some) corporate governance practices can lead to 
higher valuation and rates of return. The first such paper, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003) find that the more anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) a company has in its 
charter, the lower its performance.
4  Since then a number of papers have documented 
for the US positive relationships between corporate governance practices and 
valuation, rates of return and performance (e.g., Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2004).  
Studies for other countries (e.g., India (Black et al. 2007), Korea (Black et al. 2006; 
Black and Kim 2007), Brazil (Nenova 2005), Bulgaria (Atanasov et al. 2007), Czech 
Republic (Glaeser, Johnson, Shleifer, 2000)) have found similar results.  
However, theoretical analysis has also suggested that there can be trade-offs with 
respect to corporate governance requirements. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997) 
argue in particular that too much monitoring and legal protection may hurt managerial 
initiative and consequently lower returns and worsen company valuation. They argue 
that constraints on managers through monitoring may be costly precisely because 
managerial discretion comes with benefits. Managers are less inclined to show 
initiative, like searching for new, profitable investment projects, when shareholders 
are more likely to interfere. Along the same lines, Boot, Gopalan and Thakor (2006) 
find that corporate governance controls may sometimes prevent management from 
doing what it should and thereby actually exacerbate agency problems.  
These theoretical papers suggest that there can be trade-offs between the gains 
from monitoring and those from (more) managerial initiative, and too intensive 
monitoring can be inefficient. The trade-off is likely to depend, among others, on the 
degree of interaction between internal (boards, committees, company charters, 
                                                 
4However, some other studies show that this methodology not only can be incorrect (Arcot and Bruno, 
2006) or not associated with performance (Core et al., 2006), but when valid, its association with 
performance is not necessary monotonic (Hannes, 2002). 
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structure, legal protection) mechanisms of corporate governance. The empirical 
literature has indeed identified some examples of counter-effects of strong corporate 
governance. Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) point out that there is a difference 
between strong corporate governance and optimal corporate governance, as stronger 
corporate governance does not necessary mean better performance and higher 
valuation because costs may offset the benefits. A number of papers have found that 
the introduction of some new regulations can be counterproductive for valuation. 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) and Wintoki (2007) find that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in the US hurts some companies’ valuation, and Litvak (2007a and 2007b) finds 
that foreign companies cross-listed in the US from well-governed countries reacted 
worse to the Act, as did already high-disclosing companies. 
 
Furthermore, there is at least anecdotal evidence that the implementation of 
corporate governance practices may not be the result of optimal contracting, but of 
other pressures. Worldwide, there is an increasing appetite for more regulation and 
rigid laws (besides the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and similar efforts in other countries, 
there are calls for laws requiring increased hedge funds transparency and reforms of 
the company laws), especially after the recent wave of corporate failures. 
Increasingly, public opinion, press and institutional investors are asking for more 
rigidity, and more and more sophisticated corporate governance practices are being 
required of companies. But many of these requirements do not have strong theoretical, 
let alone empirical support that they help with company performance. It also raises the 
risk of corporate governance becoming a tick-box exercise, where the more boxes 
ticked, the better corporate governance is considered, without necessarily being 
supported by empirical evidence or theoretical analyses (Arcot and Bruno, 2006). 
 
This is not to say that corporate governance does not matter. Cross-country work 
has shown that corporate governance reforms can pay off in term of higher valuations.  
Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2006) in a cross-country study show the specific 
importance of board independence and board committees. Studies have found though 
that the corporate governance aspects that matter for valuation vary by country. A 
company, for example, may not have an independent board, but may have strong 
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environments may still provide for appropriate internal and external (market) 
monitoring, but not in others. By using cross-country data, one can investigate what 
the impact of higher legal protection on performance is relative to corporate 
governance practices exercised at the company level (and vice-versa). Only a few 
studies have so far looked at both these perspectives. Using data on company 
corporate governance practices across countries, Durnev and Kim (2005) and Klapper 
and Love (2004) show the impact of corporate governance to be a decreasing function 
of legal protection.  Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) show that country effects 
dominate company corporate governance practices in determining valuations. Durnev 
and Fauver (2007) draw attention to the links between corporate governance and 
government policies, including corruption and predatory behavior. They find that in 
countries with more predatory governments, companies practice weaker corporate 
governance and disclose less financial information. This cross-country work has, 
however, only started to address the interface between legal regimes and corporate 
governance practices. For instance, it is not clear, given different legal regimes, 
whether the constitution of board committees is important, whether their 
independence plays a role, and to what extent these practices they impact company 
performance.  
 
Corporate governance is both a way to reduce agency costs and limit pet projects, 
leading to more efficient investments, boosting growth and performance and a way to 
protect investors from managerial expropriation, thus easing companies in accessing 
financing and enhancing valuation. In particular, corporate governance can mitigate 
the problem of inefficient access to finance (credit rationing). Borrowers with large 
private benefits for which performance conveys little information about managerial 
actions, are more likely to see their positive NPV projects turned down by the capital 
markets (Tirole, 2006). In particular, when investor protection is low and corporate 
governance practices are hard to enforce, there will be a limit on the fraction of future 
cash flows that companies can credibly commit to outside investors (“limited 
pledgeability” of cash flow, Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2005). It is therefore important 
for the company to bond itself credibly to higher quality corporate governance, which 
can involve the cross-listing or the use of ADRs (Doidge et al., 2004).  In general, a 
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to be governed well after the funds have been raised. Corporate governance is in great 
part about mitigating this commitment problem: “Corporate governance deals with 
the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
 
This commitment problem is particularly large for companies that rely heavily on 
external financing.
5  But a test whether companies which are heavy users of external 
finance are valued higher when better corporate governance practices are in place can 
not unambiguously show that corporate governance reduces the agency problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection. The reason is that the association between 
corporate governance and company external financing can arise from reverse 
causality, that is, companies improve corporate governance practices (only) when 
raising new funds. Conversely, external financing could trigger changes in 
companies’ corporate governance structures, in part as investors require changes. 
Therefore, using actual external measures of external financing could create 
endogeneity problems.  
 
In a seminal paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show how external financial 
dependent companies grow more in countries with greater financial development. 
They solve the simultaneity bias⎯financially more developed countries having 
companies with a greater degree of external financing⎯by identifying an industry’s 
need for external finance from data for US companies. The US can provide a 
benchmark for external financing dependence if two conditions hold: capital markets 
in the US are relatively frictionless, and a technological demand at the industry level 
for external financing carries over to other countries. We use a similar argument to 
investigate whether companies belonging to industries that are financially more 
dependent are higher valued when displaying better corporate governance practices or 
                                                 
5 Lombardo and Pagano (2002) formalize the above argument in a simple model. They argue that 
corporate governance, and more generally the legal environment, can affect the severity of agency 
problems between company insiders and outside shareholders in two ways. First, it may directly reduce 
the private benefits that managers are able to extract from companies. This shifts the demand function 
upwards, thus increasing the quantity of external equity and reducing the cost of capital to companies 
in equilibrium. Second, it reduces the auditing and judicial costs that shareholders potentially incur. 
This effect shifts the supply curve down, thus again increasing the quantity of available external 
finance and lower the cost of capital. Overall, the effect on the equilibrium quantity is always positive. 
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adds value for those companies most in need of external financing because 
shareholders rights are more protected, without the simultaneity problems. Our 
analysis differs from Rajan and Zingales methodology, besides using company-
specific corporate governance measures, in that we do not limit our analysis to 
manufacturing industries only, but include all companies (except for financial 
institutions). 
 
Another important variable affecting the impact of corporate governance on 
company valuation may be size. In the general finance literature size has been found 
to matter for company performance. Small companies may have better growth 
opportunities, reflected in higher valuation (Shin and Stulz, 2000). Size also proxies 
for company age and older and larger companies tend to have lower ratio market-to-
book ratios. Beck at al. (2005) find a size effect in the association between financial 
development and growth, possibly because smaller companies face tighter credit 
constraints than large companies.  There might also be a relationship between size and 
corporate governance practices. Some empirical evidence finds that strong corporate 
governance is more beneficial for large than for small companies. For instance, 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2006) find that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was more 
harmful for small companies, for which the costs of complying with corporate 
governance rules outweighs the benefits. 
 
In order to limit the endogeneity problem between corporate governance choices 
and company size, we again apply the Rajan and Zingales methodology by interacting 
companies’ corporate governance with a proxy for size at the industry level. 
Specifically, we test whether companies belonging to industries that have in the US 
on average larger sized companies perform better if they have stronger corporate 
governance than companies belonging to small-size industries. Among others, such 
evidence will highlight whether strong corporate governance is equally beneficial for 
large and small companies.  
 
Performance would not only need to differ with corporate governance practices, 
external financial dependence and size. They can also be industry dependent, varying 
with company leverage, degree of assets intangibility or because of cross-listing on 
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to capture these company characteristics. 
 
Besides affecting the availability and cost of external financing, and therefore 
valuation, corporate governance can affect economic performance in other ways too. 
By putting more pressure on management and punishing management for bad 
performance, better corporate governance encourages managers to pursue more value-
maximizing projects, be more efficient in company operations, and therefore increase 
value added (Jensen, 1986). We therefore also analyze how companies’ return on 
assets relates to corporate governance practices and legal regimes. 
 
3.  Data and Econometric Models  
 
Data on corporate governance practices analyzed 
The corporate governance data come from the proxy voting agent Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS). ISS gathers corporate governance information of 
approximately 5300 US companies and 2400 non-US companies from Canada, 
Europe, East Asia and Pacific for the period 2003 – 2005. The non-US companies it 
covers are all large and belong to the main indices of their respective country stock 
markets. For instance, the UK companies mainly belong to the FTSE350 index. The 
US coverage is wider as it covers also mid- and small cap companies. Therefore, to 
avoid over-sampling problems we select a sub-sample of US companies, specifically 
all those belonging to the S&P500 index. The sample then reduces to 7078 total 
company-year observations.  
 
In terms of corporate governance practices, ISS documents among others the 
presence or lack thereof of the following:  
-  board independence: whether the board is controlled by a majority of 
independent outsiders; 
-  nomination, compensation, and audit committees composition: whether the 
committees exist and if they consist solely of independent outsiders; 
-  governance committee composition: whether the committee exists or not; 
  11-  degree of board entrenchment: whether the board is annually elected (not 
staggered), whether no poison pills are in place, majority vote is required to 
amend charter/bylaws or to approve mergers; 
-  whether chairman and CEO are separated; 
-  whether former CEO sits on the board; 
-  relations with the auditors: whether auditors are ratified at the recent 
shareholder meeting, and the consulting fees (audit related and others) paid to 
auditors are less than audit fees; and 
-  whether the CEO is not listed as having a related-party transaction in the 
proxy statement. 
 
In addition to this information ISS collects information on corporate governance 
practices which we do not consider in our analysis. This is in part because of limited 
variability within countries among some of these corporate governance practices, 
which may be the consequence of legal requirements. For instance, the percentage of 
companies where shareholders may act by written consent is 99% for European and 
Asian companies: the inclusion of such items in our index would confound the 
econometric results.
6 ISS also gather information on the size of the board, on whether 
directors have participated in ISS education programs, or on the authority of the board 
to hire own advisors. Such data are generally available, but their associations with 
performance are not clearly theoretically motivated. We, therefore, exclude them from 
our analysis to avoid any spurious results. Finally, there are some practices with many 
missing or non available observations which would reduce our sample too much.   
 
Using the above provisions and on the basis of earlier work and theoretical 
analysis, we construct five main different indices. 
1.  Committees index. Codes of best practices stress the importance of the 
committees as a corporate governance device. In particular, the presence of a 
                                                 
6 The problems of missing observations and limited variability concern especially the following 
corporate governance practices: shareholders may act by written consent or call special meetings, anti-
takeover characteristics (TIDE, sunset, trigger, etc) which are typical to the US but not to other 
markets, the existence of interlocks among compensation committee members, proxy contest defense, 
shareholders vote on directors selected to fill vacancies, board attendance. For these reasons, we can 
not construct all the corporate governance provisions of Bebchuk et al (2004). Of the 18 provisions 
considered by Bebchuk et al., for example, only four apply our sample us (limits to special meeting and 
written consent, no cumulative vote, blank check), while the other 14 are typical for the US only. 
Regardless, these 14 provisions do not appear to be significant in the Bebchuk study. 
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a more transparent procedure of directors’ appointments, compensation 
approval and internal audit, respectively. We initially assign one point for each 
committee a company has: the resulting index, COMM1, therefore considers 
only the existence or not of a committee, and it ranges from 0 to 4. However, 
codes of corporate governance also advocate for a certain degree of 
independence of the committee members. We therefore create another index 
that gives points respectively for strict independence of nomination, 
compensation and audit committees: the resulting index COMM2 ranges from 
0 to 3.  
2.  Entrenchment index. We follow Bebchuk et al. (2004) and we give one point 
each if a company has no poison pills in place, if the board is annually elected 
(no staggered), if a majority is required for mergers and if a majority is 
required for charter amendments (no supermajority). Differently from 
Bebchuk et al., we do not have data on golden parachutes, and on charter and 
bylaws separately. The resulting index (BEBCHUK) varies from 0 to 4. 
3.  Board independence index. We construct a dummy INDEP1 that takes the 
value 1 if the board consists of a majority of independent members, as judged 
by ISS. We also have information of the presence of the former CEO on the 
board and of the separation between CEO and Chairman, which are both 
proxy for a greater division of the powers in the board, and hence of greater 
independence. We therefore also construct the index INDEP3 which, in 
addition to INDEP1, considers the presence of the former CEO on the board 
and whether the CEO and the Chairman are separated or not (with the index to 
vary from 0 to 3). 
4.  Transparency index. In addition to the existence of the audit committee, a 
higher degree of transparency can be guaranteed by the ratification of the 
choice of auditors at the shareholders’ annual meeting. Further, if consulting 
fees paid to the auditors are less than audit fees, the existence of possible 
conflicts of interests will be less and the credibility of the auditor’s report will 
be higher. Recent high-profile frauds and some accounting literature (e.g., 
Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004) highlight the use of related party transactions as 
a way of manipulation profits. We, therefore, give points if the auditors are 
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if the CEO is not involved in related party transactions. The index TRANSP 
goes from 0 to 3. 
 
Data on country-level indicator of investor protection 
Consistently with the existing literature, we consider both de-jure and de-facto 
aspects of investor protection: the LLSV anti-director index as revised by Djankov et 
al. (2007), the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Law and Order index, and 
the anti-self-dealing index as elaborated by Djankov et al. (2007). The widely used 
and cited indicator anti-director index of La Porta et al. (1998) consists of six sub-
indices capturing the possibility of voting by mail and of depositing shares, aspects of 
cumulative voting, oppressed minority, preemptive rights, and the percentage of share 
capital to call a meeting. This index covers aspects of de-jure regulation since it does 
not control for the level of regulatory enforceability. On the contrary, the ICRG Law 
and Order Index assess de-facto aspects of the law and order tradition of a country. 
For the ICRG index, we take the average over the three years 2002-2005.  Finally, we 
use the self-dealing index constructed by Djankov et al. (2007) which is the sum of 
two indices: the ex-ante private control against self-dealing and the ex-post control 
against self-dealing. The ex-ante index covers disclosure and approval requirements 
imposed by law. The ex-post control of self dealing mainly looks at enforceability 
issues as it scores how easy it is for minority shareholders to obtain redress through 
the courts in case of legal disputes (standing rights to sue, ease of holding 
management or the body liable for civil damages). 
We normalized these three legal indices on a scale from 0 to 1 and we construct 
three investor protection indicators:  
-  INV_PROT1: the sum of the LLSV revised anti-director index and the ICRG 
Law and Order index; 
-  INV_PROT2: the sum of INV_PROT1 and the anti-self dealing index; 
-  INV_PROT3: the product of the revised anti-director index with the ICRG 
Law and Order Index so as to get a measure of the effective degree of investor 
protection (as in Durnev and Kim, 2005).  
 
 
  14Summary statistics 
Of the total 7078 observations in the ISS dataset, we exclude in the main 
regression results financial companies and companies of countries with no La Porta et 
al. (1997, 2006) LLSV index (Bermuda, 9 observations) or for which we have only 
one year observation: China (2 observations), Cayman Island (1 observation), Israel 
(2 observations), Luxemburg (3 observations), Thailand (1 observation), and South 
Africa (1 observation). We are then left with a total of 5857 company-year 
observations, for which we have a complete set of information in terms of the 
existence and independence of board committees (COMM1 and COMM2). However, 
we progressively lose observations in the construction of some of the other corporate 
governance indicators. In particular, we lose 228 observations in the creation of 
BEBCHUK, 750 for INDEP1, 2348 for INDEP3, and 2829 for TRANSP. Among 
others, we have very limited information on the level of board independence of 
Austrian companies (5 observations), and the separation of the roles between the 
Chairman and the CEO in Japan (3 observations), Portugal (3 observations), and 
Spain (5 observations). Due to the problem of missing observations, in the following 
analysis we will mainly focus on three indicators for which we have the largest 
number of observations: COMM1, BEBCHUK, and INDEP1. 
 
Table 1.A reports summary statistics of the governance indicators described above 
by country. The analysis of the data by country shows an interesting picture of the 
differences in corporate governance practices across countries. Ireland scores the 
highest (2) in the INV_PROT1 indicator, followed by UK (1.97) and Singapore 
(1.89). Greece and Italy are at the bottom of the ranking (0.98). Similar differences 
obtain for INV_PROT2 and INV_PROT3. US companies tend to have all four board 
committees (on average COMM1=3.94), similar to Canadian companies 
(COMM1=3.82). At the bottom in terms of board committees, we find Danish 
(COMM1=0.11) and Austrian companies (COMM1=0.31). Danish companies stand 
out also for the absence of independent committees (COMM2=0), while again US 
(COMM2=2.66) and Canadian (COMM2=1.97) companies are well above the sample 
average of COMM2=1.04. Companies in Hong Kong (BEBCHUK=2.06) tend to give 
more power to shareholders. In terms of board independence, Italian and Japanese 
  15companies rank the lowest on the two corporate governance indicators (INDEP1, 
INDEP3). There is not much variation in the TRANP index across countries.  
 
Table 1.B shows the percentage of incidence of corporate governance provisions 
per indicator. For the COMM1 indicator, most companies have an audit committee 
(83%), but only in 40% of the cases do companies have an audit committee consisting 
of a majority of independent members. Similarly, in roughly half of cases, do 
companies have a nomination committee (52%), but only in 26% of the cases do we 
observe independent nomination committees. Only in 31% of cases do companies 
have a governance committee. The absence of poisons pills (80%) clearly stands out 
as the driver of the BEBCHUK index, while in only very few cases (10%) is a simple 
majority required to amend the company charters/bylaws. Roughly half of the 
companies have a majority of independent board members (46%), a percentage which 
increase to 65% for INDEP3 due to a lower number of observations. In 40% of the 
cases does the company have a separated CEO/Chairman. In 91% of company-year 
observations is the CEO considered not to have related party transactions (TRANSP).  
 
Table 1.C shows the overlap (or lack thereof) between country-level requirements 
and the main corporate governance practices.   For instance, it shows the relation 
between the level of investor protection (INV_PROT1) and the existence of 
committees (COMM1). The majority of companies in countries with an INV_PROT1 
index less than 1.7 have all board committees (20.45%), an independent board 
(26.85%), and a BEBCHUK index equal to 1 (18.60%). However, when INV_PROT1 
index is equal or greater than 1.7, companies tend to have only one board committee 
(25.7%), a not independent board (46.33%), and a BEBCHUK index equal to 1 
(40.06%). There is, therefore, not a clear and monotonically relation between investor 
protection at the country level and the existence of board committees. The largest 
majority of companies have a low BEBCHUCK indicator, but there is an equal split 
in terms of board independence across the level of investor protection INV_PROT1.  
 
Financial data 
For US companies, financial data are obtained from COMPUSTAT, while for 
non-US companies we use Worldscope data. As mentioned before, our companies are 
  16large in size, with an average total assets of $US10 billion and an average total sales 
of $US7.9 billion (Table 1.D).  
 
We use Tobin’s Q as our main performance measure. As in La Porta et al. (2002), 
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004), and Durnev and Kim (2005), we define Tobin’s Q 
as the sum of total assets plus the market value of equity less book value of equity, 
over total assets. The average Tobin’s Q of the companies in our sample is 1.66. In 
our robustness checks, we also use Return on Assets (ROA), where ROA is defined as 
the ratio of the earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) to the book value of assets. The average ROA in our sample is 0.06. 
 
As control variables, we use the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio of 
property-plants-equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), the 1-year growth of sales (G_S), 
the ratio of capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX_SALES), the ratio of total debt to 




We construct our measure of external financing dependence as Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) do. The Rajan and Zingales industrial measure refers to only US 
manufacturing industries for the year 1980; as our data are for the period 2003-2005, 
we update the measure of external financing dependence for all 2-digit SIC code 
industries, using the COMPUSTAT universe of US companies for the year 2000. 
Rajan and Zingales used the 3-digits ISIC code for identifying industries, which 
typically corresponds to the 2-digits SIC code.  A company’s dependence on external 
finance is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations 
divided by capital expenditures.
8
 
                                                 
7 We winsorize at the 1% and 99% percentile Tobin’s Q, G_S, CAPEX_SALES, and D_E to limit the 
effects of serious outliers. As common in the literature, we also drop observations with negative values 
for common equity. 
8 Differently from Rajan and Zingales (1998), for the period 2000, the variable cash flow from 
operations (COMPUSTAT item 110) is no longer available due to a change in accounting rules. Cash 
flow is therefore calculated as the sum of COMPUSTAT items 123, 125, 126, 106, 213, and 217, plus 
the change in working capital (the sum of COMPUSTAT items 302, 303, and 304). Capital 
expenditures are calculated as the sum of COMPUSTAT items 128 and 129. A limited number of 
industries consist of a very small number of companies, which could lead to biases in the constructed 
index. We therefore exclude the values at the 2.5% and 97.5% percentile.  
  17Finally, we construct a proxy measure of each industry’s natural size, measured by 
the industry k’s share of employment in companies with more than 20 employees in 
the United States.
9 As Beck et al. (2005) do, we find a very small positive correlation 
between Large Firm Share and External Dependence, which suggests that the industry 
characteristics explaining company size are not the same as the characteristics 
explaining technological dependence on external finance.
 
Econometric model and strategy 
Besides univariate analysis, to investigate the associations between corporate 
governance, external financing dependence and performance, we use the following 
econometric specifications. 
 
Corporate governance and performance 
To capture the associations of country and company governance with 
performance, we regress Tobin’s Q on indicators of companies’ corporate governance 
and the strength of legal environment, while controlling for industry, time, and other 
company characteristics, over the period 2003 – 2005. As in Durnev and Kim (2005), 
we use country random effects because some of the explanatory variables are at the 
country level, precluding the use of country fixed effects. Furthermore, the Breusch-
Pagan (1980) test suggests the presence of unobserved country level heterogeneity. 
Specifically, we estimate the following country, random effects regression with time 
and industry fixed effects: 
 
  
             ( 1 )  
, ) ( * _ _ , , , , 2 1 , t i t i t i t i t i controls Firms CG PROT INV CG PROT INV Y
c c c c c c c ε γ β β α + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
                                                 
9 Such proxy is available from the 2000 US Census for industries classified according to the 3-digit 
NAICS code. We then converted the 3-digit NAICS into 2-digit SIC code for the following reasons. 
First, the original test by Rajan and Zingales (1998) mainly uses 3-digit ISIC codes, that corresponds to 
the 2-digit SIC codes. Secondly, the number of industries classified according to the 3-digit NAICS 
code is almost double the number of companies classified according to the 2-digit SIC code. Since in 
our regressions, we control also for industry fixed effects, besides countries and time dummies, this 
could lead to less degrees of freedoms. There are few cases where more than one industry classified 
according to the 3-digit NAICS code corresponds to one industry classified according to the 2-digit SIC 
code. In such circumstances, we take the average.
  18where   is Tobin’s Q, the variable  Y _ INV PROT  is the country-level investor 
protection indicator, while   is the vector of  the company corporate governance 
indicator(s) as described above.  And in terms of indexes, c is country, i is company, 
and t is time. Theoretical and empirical literature predict the coefficients 
CG
2 1,β β  to be 
positive and γ  to be negative. By summing various coefficients, we can find the 
overall economic effect of an increase in the investors’ protection strength in the 
presence of different company’s corporate governance practices. 
 
To capture the differences in valuation for a given level of country and company-
level corporate governance, we divide companies according to their level of country 
and company-level of corporate governance, i.e., above or below the respective 
medians. We, therefore, end up with four groups: companies with both high (above 
the median) levels of country and company corporate governance (HiHi), companies 
with high level of country investor protection but low (below the median) level of 
company corporate governance (HiLo), and vice versa (LoHi), and finally companies 
with low standards of both country and company corporate governance (LoLo). 
Besides univariate analysis documenting the differences in performance among these 
four groups of companies, we perform the following country random effects 
regression with time and industry fixed effects:  
 












t i controls Firms Lo Lo Lo Hi Hi Hi Y ε β β β α + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
 
where Y  is again Tobin’s Q,    are dummy variables equal to 1 if the 
company corporate governance structure is characterized by high standards at both 
country and company levels (HiHi), by high standards at the country and low 
standards at the company level (HiLo), or by low standards at both the country and 
company levels (LoLo), and 0 otherwise. The country-level indicator is INV_PROT1, 
divided between high (Hi) and low (Lo) according to the 23-countries median. The 
company-level governance indicators are COMM1, COMM2, BEBCHUK, INDEP1, 
INDEP3 and TRANSP, which are divided between high (Hi) and low (Lo) according 
to their overall sample median. The estimated coefficients 
LoLo HiLo HiHi , ,
3 2 1 , , β β β  provide then the 
differences in performance, all compared to the base case, i.e., those companies with 
  19high corporate governance standards in the presence of low country investor 
protection (LoHi). 
 
In both specifications (1) and (2) we control for the usual variables found to be 
associated with performance, i.e., size, tangibility of assets, and cross-listing in other 
exchanges, for which we use respectively the logarithm of sales (in US$), the ratio of 
property, plants, and equipment (PPE) to sales, and a dummy equal to 1 if a company 
has American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded. As argued by Durnev and Kim 
(2005), we use sales because it is less affected than earnings by diversion, 
manipulation, and different accounting rules; however, our results are robust to the 
use of the logarithm of total assets. We use the ratio of PPE to sales because 
companies operating with higher proportions of fixed assets (and lower proportions of 
intangible assets) may find it less necessary (or optimal) to adopt stricter governance 
mechanisms to signal to investors that they intend to prevent the future misuse of 
intangible assets (Klapper and Love, 2004). Finally, empirical evidence suggests that 
companies cross-listed on US exchanges are valued higher (Doidge et al., 2004; 
Coffee, 2002). Regressions (1) and (2) include time fixed effects, 2-digit SIC code 
industry fixed effects, and clustered standard errors at country level as this is the 
source of possible autocorrelation. We do not use country fixed effects because the 
INV_PROT acts as a country dummy already, nor company fixed effects because, as 
in Gompers et al. (2003), we do not have enough variability in the corporate 
governance indicators over the short time period we consider. As is common in this 
literature, financial companies are excluded from the main regressions, but we do 




We perform three sets of robustness checks: a. at the company-level; b. regarding the 





  20a. Robustness of the control variables, sample and performance measure 
We use an alternative set of controls as in Black et al. (2005): the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales, the ratio of total debt to equity, and 1-year growth of sales, to 
control for investment intensity, leverage, and growth opportunities, respectively. We 
also check whether our results are still valid with the inclusion of financial companies 
(SIC code 6). Finally, we use ROA as an alternative accounting measure of 
performance.  
b. Robustness of the country-level indicator of investor protection 
We check the robustness of both the association of governance with performance and 
the differences among groups of companies by using alternative country-level 
indicators of investor protection INV_PROT2 and INV_PROT3. 
c. Robustness of the overall governance impact on performance 
To confirm the impact of the incremental effect of higher country-level investor 
protection, we run the following regression: 
 










t i controls Firms Hi Hi PROT INV PROT INV Y ε γ β β α + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
           ( 3 )  
where   is again Tobin’s Q, INV_PROT is the country-level indicator INV_PROT1, 
and   is a dummy equal to 1 if the company-level corporate governance indicator is 
above the median, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient 
Y
Hi
1 β  indicates the investor 
protection effect for companies with low (Lo), i.e., below the median, corporate 
governance practices. The coefficient  2 β   indicates the incremental effect for 
companies with high (Hi), i.e., above the median, corporate governance practices, all 
relative to poorly governed companies (Lo). The sum of the coefficients  2 1 β β +   
indicates the total effect of country-level investor protection on performance for 
highly-governed companies (Hi). Finally, the coefficient γ  tests whether the 
performance of highly-governed companies is different from that of poorly-governed 
ones when country-level investor protection is weak.  
 
  21Corporate governance, external financing dependence, size and performance 
To test whether companies belonging to industries that typically are more 
financially dependent perform better with better corporate governance, we use the 
Rajan and Zingales methodology to overcome causality issues in the analysis of the 
associations between corporate governance, external financing dependence and 
performance. Specifically, we interact the measure of industry external financing 
dependence with a measure of the company’s corporate governance quality to 
estimate the following country random effects model: 
 










t k i effects Fixed Size DEP EXT GOV Y ε β α + + + ⋅ ⋅ + =
 
where   is Tobin’s Q,   is the Rajan and Zingales measure of 
dependence on external financing at the industry level k, and   is the logarithm of 
sales.   is the country (INV_PROT) or company-level (CG ) corporate 
governance  or their combination  , with all the indicators as 
defined before. The regression is run with 2-digit SIC code industry and time fixed 
effects, with robust standard errors clustered at the country level. The United States is 
dropped as it is the benchmark.  
Y DEP EXT _
Size
GOV
CG PROT INV * _
 
If corporate governance matters more for external financing dependent companies, 
we would expect the coefficient β  of the interaction term to be positive and 
significant. If so, this would suggest that corporate governance is especially important 
to guarantee an efficient allocation of external capital resources and high returns. The 
better monitoring of management enhances investors’ confidence for those companies 
and leads to higher company’s valuation.  
 
As in other papers, we check whether our evidence is robust when controlling for 
cross-industry differences in size. The models we estimate with this size variable are: 
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where   is the 2-digit SIC code industry k’s share of employment in 
companies with more than 20 employees in the United States as from the US Census, 
and     and GOV  are as defined above. The regressions are run 
with industry and time fixed effects, with robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. If in regression (5.1) the estimated coefficient 
share firm Large
, Y , _ DEP EXT Size
β  is positive and 
significant, then higher standards of corporate governance are more valuable for 
large-size companies, e.g., because those companies can bear the costs of it. Finally, 
the coefficients  1 β  and  2 β  in regression (5.2) will indicate whether stronger corporate 
governance matters more for large or high external financial dependent companies: if 
one of the two effects prevail, we would expect only one of the coefficients  1 β  and 
2 β  to be significant.  
 
4. Results 
Univariate Analysis  
Table 2  provides an initial assessment of the association between corporate 
governance and performance (Tobin’s Q) for the main indicators (INV_PROT1, 
COMM1, BEBCHUK, INDEP1). We provide these data for the four groups of 
companies/countries: companies with both high (above the median) levels of country 
investor protection and company corporate governance (HiHi), companies with high 
level of country investor protection but low (below the median) level of company 
corporate governance (HiLo) and vice-versa (LoHi), and finally companies in low 
country investor protection and with low company corporate governance (LoLo).  
There is a clear, but non-monotonic interaction between corporate governance 
at the company and at the country level. Take for instance COMM1. Companies with 
a high level of corporate governance have higher Tobin's Q than companies with a 
low level of corporate governance. But companies in countries with a high level of 
corporate governance do not have higher Tobin's Q than companies in countries with 
  23low corporate governance. In particular, when both the country and company are high 
(INV_PROT1 HIGH and COMM1 HIGH), companies do not have the highest 
average Tobin’s Q (1.70). Rather companies with COMM1 HIGH incorporated in a 
country with relatively low investor protection level (INV_PROT1 LOW) have the 
highest Tobin's Q (2.03). This evidence is further confirmed with BEBCHUK and 
INDEP1 as company-level indicators. Surprisingly, the governance combination 
COMM1 LOW and INV_PROT1 HIGH is not associated with a higher average 
Tobin’s Q (1.42) than the combination COMM1 LOW and INV_PROT1 LOW (1.53). 
This is also true for the other company-level indicators. Of course, these are 
univariate comparisons and we need check whether such associations still hold in our 
multivariate analyses. 
 
Corporate governance and performance 
We first show the results of the association between governance choices and 
performance, estimated using equation (1), with regression results reported in Table 3.  
We first consider country level investor protection and each of the six indices 
(COMM1, COMMM2, BEBCHUK, INDEP1, INDEP3, and TRANSP) separately and 
interacted with INV_PROT1 (columns I-VI). Note that, given missing observations 
on companies’ corporate governance practices, we have fewer observations for the 
last two indexes. We find that the degree of investor protection is not statistically 
significant for any of the indexes. We do find that each of company practices matter, 
however, with all coefficients positive and significant at the 1% level. This means that 
the existence of board committees, lack of entrenchment at the board level, board 
independence and transparency contributes to higher valuation.
10 In terms of 
relationship between country and company corporate governance, we find that the 
interaction terms of the various company practices with INV_PROT1 are all negative 
and significant at the 1% level. This suggests a substitution effect between company 
and country corporate governance and in particular that the impact of corporate 
governance practices at the company level are all less when investors’ protection at 
country level is high. The coefficients of the control variables are in line with the 
                                                 
10 Additionally, as in Bebchuk et al. (2004) we examine the association between staggered boards and 
firm value for US companies only. We find that the governance indicator BEBCHUK is positive and 
significant also for our sample of companies. 
  24results found in the literature: size (log of sales) and capital intensity (the ratio of 
property, plants, and equipments (PPE) over sales) are negative and highly significant, 
while the dummy ADR is positive and significant only in two cases.  
We next run the regressions using at the same time three indexes, COMM1, 
BEBCHUK, and INDEP1, and their interactions with INV_PROT1 (regression VII). 
We find now that the INV_PROT1 is statistically significant positive, that the three 
indexes themselves remain positive statistically significant, and that all three 
interactions are again statistically significant negative, confirming the evidence above. 
We also run similar regressions using COMM2, INDEP3 and TRANSP as company 
corporate governance indexes (results not shown here). We obtain similar results with 
COMM2 and TRANSP, while INDEP3 is no more significant, which suggests that, in 
terms of independence, what matters is the effective independence at the board level 
rather than other matters such as the separation of the CEO/Chairman roles.
11
By calculating the overall impact of the constructed indexes we can show the 
economic impact of differences in legal regime. The regression result of column VII, 
for example, implies that one standard deviation (0.26) increase in INV_PROT1 is 
associated with an effect on Tobin’s Q of 0.26 * [0.57 – 0.20*COMM1 – 
0.31*BEBCHUK – 0.46*INDEP1]. The overall magnitude of the impact of legal 
reform thus depends on the degree of corporate governance in place at the company 
level. Take for instance companies with COMM1=4: one standard deviation increase 
in INV_PROT1 is associated with a decrease in Tobin’s Q of 0.26* [-0.23 – 
0.31*BEBCHUK – 0.46*INDEP1], i.e., with a decrease of at least 0.0598, which is 
3.5% of the average Tobin’s Q.
12 The effect is even more negative when the board 
consists of a majority of independent directors, because for companies with 
COMM1=4 and INDEP1=1 one standard deviation increase in INV_PROT1 is 
associated with a decrease in Tobin’s Q of 0.26*[-0.69 – 0.31*BEBCHUK], i.e., a 
minimum decrease of 0.1796 (10.8% of the average Tobin’s Q).
13 In other words, our 
results suggest possible overregulation from stronger legal regimes when company 
corporate governance practices in place are already high. 
                                                 
11 When using INDEP3 and TRANSP, the sample is reduced by 30-50% and these results thus have to 
be considered with some caveats. 
12 For which we have 1734 total observations, with an average INV_PROT1 index of 1.55. 
13 For which we have 1589 total observations, with an average INV_PROT1 index of 1.53. 
  25We next run the regressions using instead of INV_PROT1, our other two indexes 
of investor protection, INV_PROT2 and INV_PROT3 (regressions VIII and IX).  The 
results found above are substantially confirmed when using INV_PROT3 as the 
country level index. However, the positive association between country legal investor 
protection and valuation is not significant when using INV_PROT2 as indicator 
(column VIII), with BEBCHUK not significant as well. Given also the previous 
results, we can therefore conclude that the positive associations between country 
investor protection and the level of board entrenchment with performance are not 
always robust to alternative measures and specifications.  
We next run the regressions following equation (2) using the dummies for the Hi-
Lo country regimes and company corporate governance practices, where the category 
Lo investor protection and Hi company practice is the “base” case and thus dropped 
(Table 4). We see here clearly the effects of different combinations of country 
regimes and company corporate governance practices, and the differences in valuation 
effects of these combinations.   Relative to the base case (Lo investor protection and 
Hi company practices), all other combinations have statistically significant lower 
Tobin's Q, with the difference being the highest for the combination Hi investor 
protection regime with Lo company practices ( 2 β  ranging from - 0.46 to -0.80) 
depending on which company corporate governance measure we use.  The coefficient 
3 β  of the combination where both investor protection and company practices are Lo, 
is between -0.24 and -0.70, not very different from the Hi investor protection regime 
with Lo company practices. In particular, the differences between the coefficients  2 β  
and  3 β  are never statistically significant different, except for the TRANSP index, 
when it is statistically significant different at the 6% level.   
This lack of statistically significant difference between these two groups suggests 
that for those companies with poor corporate governance practices, there are no 
effects of investor protection on company valuation.  In other words, better country 
legal investor protection is not a substitute for poor company corporate governance. 
At the same time, there is a negative effect of investor protection for those companies 
with better corporate governance practices, since the group of Hi investor protection 
and Hi company corporate governance practices, have a discount between 0.51 and 
  260.82 (depending on the specification used) compared to the base case of Lo investor 
protection and Hi company corporate governance practices, which suggests that 
stronger country corporate governance is not necessary the optimal solution. In terms 
of specific company practices, we notice from Table 4 that only high values of 
COMM1, COMM2, and INDEP1 and not of BEBCHUK, INDEP3 and TRANSP are 
statistically significant associated with higher valuation, regardless of the level (Hi or 
Lo) of country investor protection. This suggests that some company practices impact 
performance “more” than others under any country legal condition. 
These results confirm the regression results of Table 3 that there can be 
overregulation when company corporate governance practices are good, negatively 
impacting valuation. In particular, for companies of a specific country, like US or 
Canada, that on average have high company corporate governance standards, then 
there may not be a need to increase stricter country investor protection, as it can have 
a negative impact on performance. On the other hand, if companies on average 
converge to low corporate governance standards, tightening the country-level 
protection may not be sufficient to improve performance. It is worth, though, to 
mention that the sample of countries considered in this analysis have on average 
already a high level of investor protection compared with many emerging markets and 
developing countries.
14 While for these companies, it is the corporate governance at 
the company level that matters most, it might well be that increases in legal protection 
are effective for emerging markets and developing countries. 
We next perform several robustness checks to confirm both the significance of the 
results and the economic impact of the corporate governance variables, with results 
reported in Tables 5-7. As a first robustness check, we include three extra company 
control variables in equation (2): the one year growth of sales to control for growth 
opportunities (SALES GROWTH), the ratio of debt to equity to control for leverage, 
and degree of debt financiers’ monitoring (D_E) and the ratio of capital expenditures 
to sales to control for investment opportunities (CAPEX_SALES). We still use 
INV_PROT1 as our country legal protection index. In Table 5 (columns Ia, IIa, IIIa) 
we report the results with COMM1, BEBCHUK and INDEP1, but we find similar 
                                                 
14 The average LLSV and Self-Dealing indexes for our sample of companies are respectively 0.73 and 
0.53, compared to 0.62 and 0.39 for developing countries. 
  27results also with the other indexes. The results confirm the earlier evidence: 
companies with poor corporate governance practices are lower valued and differences 
in legal regime do not affect the discount for these companies; and for companies with 
good corporate governance practices, a stricter regime can increase the discount. We 
also run regression (2) including financial companies (SIC code 6), with the results 
found before again confirmed (columns Ib, IIb, IIIb), although for BEBCHUK the F-
test can again not reject equality of the β1 and β2 coefficients. Finally, we perform an 
additional robustness check by using the return on assets (ROA) as a performance 
measure instead of Tobin’s Q. The coefficients of the three dummies (columns Ic, IIc, 
IIIc) are still significant at the 1% level and the relative comparisons are still valid in 
case of COMM1 and INDEP1 (although for the latter the F-test can only reject 
equality of the β1 and β2 coefficients at the 8% level). 
We next run robustness checks on the impact of the specific investor protection 
index by using two alternative indices capturing the quality of the country legal 
regime, INV_PROT2 and INV_PROT3. We run again equation (2), i.e., using the 
three group dummies. We find very similar results (Table 6), especially for COMM1 
and INDEP1, with companies with high practices in low regime countries having the 
highest values and no significant differences in valuation between low and high 
investor protection countries for companies with low practices (again, for BEBCHUK 
the F-test can not reject equality of the β1 and β2 coefficients).  
We also consider whether the clearly non-monotonic relationships between 
investor protection and corporate governance practices with performance may have 
affected the results because of the specifications we have used. We, therefore, regress 
Tobin's Q on the index INV_PROT1, the interaction term INV_PROT1*COMM1 Hi 
(or the interaction with the dummy BEBCHUK Hi or INDEP1) and the dummy 
COMM1 Hi (or the dummy BEBCHUK Hi or INDEP1), with the usual company 
controls (regression 3).  In this specification, both the level of investor protection and 
good company practices are allowed to have a direct impact on valuation, yet we 
allow for a combined effect of the level of investor protection and good practices. We 
find (Table 7) that on its own INV_PROT1 is not significant for any company 
practices index used in the regressions. This once again confirms that country level 
investor protection has no significant impact on Tobin’s Q in the presence of low 
  28company corporate governance standards. The incremental effects of investor 
protection on Tobin's Q for companies with high governance practices ( 2 β , 3 β , 4 β ) 
are always negative and significant. The total effect of country investor protection on 
Tobin's Q for high standards companies ( 2 1 β β + , 3 1 , 4 1 β β + β β + ) is always negative 
and significantly different from zero, confirming the “too much of a good thing” 
effect. The only exception is in column V, where, similarly to the previous analyses, 
the total effect for BEBCHUK ceases to be significant when BEBCHUK is used at the 
same time with the COMM1 and INDEP1 indices. In terms of economic impact, the 
effect on Tobin’s Q of a one standard deviation increase in INV_PROT1 is 
0.26*[ 1 β + 2 β COMM1 Hi +  3 β BEBCHUK Hi +  4 β INDEP1], which can be smaller 
or larger than zero. For companies with COMM1 above the median, a one standard 
deviation is associated with a decrease in Q of 0.0624 (3.7% of the average). For the 
companies with also an independent board, the decrease in Q is 0.24 (14% of the 
average). 
 
Lastly, a possible concern is the large share of US companies in the sample, since 
the US has a special combination of relatively low country level corporate governance 
and a relatively high level of company corporate governance practices. We, therefore, 
also use a smaller subset of US companies, specifically those companies with higher 
(above the median) market capitalization. The main results of Tables 2 and 3 are 
confirmed (results not shown). 
 
Corporate governance, external financing dependence, and performance 
We next discuss the results of the association between corporate governance, 
external financial dependence and performance using regression specification (4). 
Table 8, column I, shows that the interaction term with investor protection 
INV_PROT1 itself is again not statistically significant.  Columns II-VII show the 
coefficients of the interaction terms when using one by one the three main governance 
indicators (COMM1, INDEP1, BEBCHUK) as well as the indicators multiplied by 
the country level of investor protection, both interacted with external financial 
dependence. The coefficients of the interaction terms external financial dependence 
with COMM1 and INDEP1 are positive and significant, while the coefficient for the 
  29interaction of external financial dependence with BEBCHUK is not statistically 
significant. We find further that the coefficient estimate of INDEP1 (0.14, column VI) 
is higher than that for COMM1 (0.035, column II), indicating the importance of board 
independence for valuation with regards to higher external financial dependence. 
When using all the company indices contemporaneously (columns VIII and IX), we 
find that COMM1 and INDEP1 remain positive and significant, while the interaction 
of external financial dependence with BEBCHUK is again not statistically significant.  
These results suggest that companies belonging to industrial sectors that rely more 
on external financing have a higher valuation the more board committees they have 
and if the board committees are independent. This can be interpreted as evidence that 
the market values strong and independent boards more than any other bonding 
practice when providing capital to companies. The channels are likely that a strong 
and independent board reduces moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and 
improves companies’ performance, particularly when naturally dependent on external 
financing. We can show the importance of these corporate governance features for 
more financial dependent companies using the following example. The industries at 
the 33% and 66% percentile have a ratio of external financial dependence equal to 
0.015 and 0.541. Using the results in column II, the coefficient estimate for the 
interaction term predicts that the difference in valuation between the 33
rd and 66
th 
percentile of financial dependent industries to be two percentage points for a company 
with an index COMM1 equal to 3 compared to a company with COMM1 equal to 1. 
 
Next we check whether the associations between corporate governance, external 
financial dependence and performance are affected by the size of the company, 
avoiding issues of simultaneity by using the average size of the companies within the 
respective industry (regression 5.1). The results in Table 9 show that companies 
belonging to industries with larger shares of big companies are higher valued if they 
have stronger corporate governance in the form of independent board committees and 
executives on the board (columns II and VI). The interaction terms with the 
BEBCHUK index (column IV) as well as with the country index INV_PROT1 are not 
statistically significant. These regression results remain when interacting the company 
indexes with the investor protection index.  Here, COMM1 and INDEP1 (columns III 
  30and VII) are again statistically significant, but BEBCHUK is now statistically 
significant only at the 10% level (column V). When including all three company 
indexes, either alone (column VIII) or interacted with investor protection (column 
IX), we find the same results, with again INDEP1 more important than COMM1.  
This evidence suggests that the market considers strong corporate governance to 
increase value, especially for those companies that are naturally large enough. This 
could be because only these companies can bear the costs of it.    
 
Lastly, we investigate how cross-industry differences in external financial 
dependence and natural company size interact with company corporate governance 
practices and legal regimes (regression 5.2). We do this for the samples of all 
companies and of manufacturing companies only (Table 10). We find the earlier 
results of good corporate governance practices having more impact for larger 
companies to be confirmed again in the case of COMM1 (columns I and II) and 
INDEP1 (columns V and VI), with the coefficients of the interaction terms with 
external dependence to remain significant only in the specification with INDEP1.  
 
Putting the results from regressions (4), (5.1) and (5.2) on the associations 
between corporate governance, external financing, size and performance together 
reinforces the view that strong corporate governance can be very beneficial in the case 
of highly financial dependent companies, as it favors more efficient management, 
capital allocation and higher valuation, and can be even more valuable for large size 
companies. This evidence, in line with previous studies (e.g., Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein, 2005) suggests that only large companies can effectively bear the cost of a 
strong corporate governance regime, while for smaller companies it can be “too much 
of a good thing”. Overall, we can conclude that better corporate governance helps in 
efficient capital allocation, and subsequently performance, mainly for companies that 
depend heavily on external financing and for large companies, and that (too) strict 
requirements may have costs for companies that largely rely on internal financing and 




  315. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we have analyzed whether and through what channels corporate 
governance at the company and country level affects performance and company 
valuation. Consistent with existing studies, we find that better corporate governance at 
the company level exerts a positive effect on performance. Not everything contributes 
equally to this association, though. The presence of board committees and board 
independence seem to play a more important role for company performance than 
other corporate governance practices.  We also find that corporate governance is more 
important for companies that especially rely on external financing. This is likely 
because of two channels. Corporate governance acts as a signaling device for 
companies having positive NPV projects, thus allowing a more efficient capital 
allocation. And once funds have been allocated, corporate governance helps through 
the monitoring of management.  
 
In terms of shareholder protection at the country level, and different from other 
results, we find a neutral or negative impact. Specifically, for companies with poor 
corporate governance practices, there is very little or no impact of better investor 
protection and for companies with good corporate governance practices, there is a 
discount from better investor protection.  We find that only for large companies or for 
companies that naturally depend heavily on external financing do strict corporate 
governance practices or requirements increase valuation.   
 
This suggests that the optimal form of corporate governance is not necessarily a 
strong form of corporate governance. This has important policy implications. 
Increasing the number and severity of country-level regulations may not always lead 
to superior performance. A straight-jacket of many corporate governance rules can, 
besides being costly in terms of direct outlays, limit managerial freedom of initiative, 
and thereby negatively affect performance. A policy-maker needs to decide both 
whether to intervene and if so, what (new) rules are the most efficient to improve 
companies’ performance and shareholders’ returns, bearing in mind that stronger rules 
do not necessarily mean better corporate governance.   
 
  32The paper does come with its caveats. One is the sample, which is limited to 
relatively well-developed countries where issues such as public enforcement and the 
quality of the judicial system are less in doubt that in many emerging markets and 
developing countries. Furthermore, there may be other mechanisms at work in these 
countries that discipline companies, but that are not captured through the investor 
protection measures we use (for example, competition in factors markets, well-
functioning banks and other financial institutions). As such, the effects might well be 
different from those developing countries where enhancing country level governance 
is likely to have positive effects on value. Indeed, results do not need to negate the 
findings in the literature that in general better corporate governance frameworks 
improve company valuation and performance. There are also likely important 
interactions between company corporate governance practices and overall public 
governance, including the presence of corruption that need to be considered when 
evaluating the effects of stronger corporate governance regimes. 
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Corporate Finance, forthcoming TABLE 1.A: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS BY COUNTRY 
 
 
      COUNTRY INDICATORS     FIRM INDICATORS 

















PROT3     COMM1     COMM2     BEBCHUK     INDEP1     INDEP3     TRANSP 





















                                         Obs. Value Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean
Country                                                           
AUSTRALIA  205                                             0.8 1 0.76 1.80 2.56 0.80 205 2.77 205 0.85 205 1.02 203 0.57 203 2.23 145 1.77
AUSTRIA  47                                             0.5 1 0.21 1.50 1.71 0.50 47 0.31 47 0.00 47 1.00 5 0.80 5 2.60 7 2.28
BELGIUM  47                                             0.6 0.83 0.54 1.43 1.97 0.50 47 1.25 47 0.25 47 0.74 22 0.27 15 1.66 2 1.41
CANADA  466                                             0.8 1 0.64 1.80 2.44 0.80 466 3.82 466 1.97 466 1.99 465 0.86 461 2.20 157 2.80
DENMARK  61                                             0.8 1 0.46 1.80 2.26 0.80 61 0.11 61 0.06 58 1.56 18 0.88 18 2.11 29 1.93
FINLAND  81                                             0.7 1 0.46 1.70 2.16 0.70 81 0.86 81 0.48 77 1.80 44 0.65 44 2.04 12 1.75
FRANCE  215                                             0.7 0.81 0.38 1.51 1.89 0.56 215 2.34 215 0.33 211 0.83 194 0.26 185 1.47 189 1.52
GERMANY  217                                             0.7 0.83 0.28 1.53 1.81 0.58 217 0.65 217 0.01 217 1.05 57 0.75 55 1.94 29 2.10
GREECE  112                                             0.4 0.58 0.22 0.98 1.20 0.23 112 0.38 112 0.04 63 2.01 73 0.04 37 1.40 3 2.33
HONG KONG  140                                             1 0.75 0.96 1.75 2.71 0.75 140 1.48 140 0.62 110 2.06 136 0.08 135 1.57 47 2.25
IRELAND  33                                             1 1 0.79 2.00 2.79 1.00 33 3.09 33 0.90 33 1.00 32 0.31 32 1.59 10 2.70
ITALY                                                 122 0.4 0.58 0.42 0.98 1.40 0.23 122 1.13 122 0.09 121 1.04 84 0.08 50 1.42 59 2.32
JAPAN                                                 1409 0.9 0.83 0.5 1.73 2.23 0.75 1409 1.04 1409 0.01 1407 1.35 1408 0.00 3 1.00 932 2.42
NETHERLANDS  123                                             0.5 1 0.2 1.50 1.70 0.50 123 1.25 123 0.72 115 0.74 51 0.92 47 2.59 15 2.13
NEW ZEALAND  38                                             0.8 1 0.95 1.80 2.75 0.80 38 2.71 38 0.34 38 1.00 37 0.37 37 1.70 24 2.20
NORWAY  58                                             0.7 1 0.42 1.70 2.12 0.70 58 0.43 58 0.24 51 1.15 17 0.82 16 2.37 15 1.86
PORTUGAL  33                                             0.5 0.83 0.44 1.33 1.77 0.42 33 0.42 33 0.09 27 1.03 19 0.26 3 2.00 10 1.70
SINGAPORE  119                                             1 0.89 1 1.89 2.89 0.89 119 2.55 119 0.87 55 1.40 107 0.50 94 2.18 27 2.77
SPAIN                                                 120 1 0.78 0.37 1.78 2.15 0.78 120 1.71 120 0.25 100 1.02 46 0.13 5 1.40 21 1.95
SWEDEN  102                                             0.7 1 0.33 1.70 2.03 0.70 102 0.89 102 0.16 101 2.01 62 0.53 56 2.32 25 1.72
SWITZERLAND   135                                             0.6 0.83 0.27 1.43 1.70 0.50 135 1.30 135 0.45 135 1.10 60 0.78 59 1.86 21 2.66
UK                                                 787 1 0.97 0.95 1.97 2.92 0.97 787 2.98 787 1.59 785 1.05 780 0.35 770 1.34 457 2.46
USA                                                 1187 0.6 0.83 0.65 1.43 2.08 0.50 1187 3.94 1187 2.66 1160 1.82 1187 0.97 1179 2.01 792 2.61
                                                   
Total obs.  5857                                                    5857 5857 5629 5107 3509 3028  
Average       0.73                               0.89 0.53 1.61 2.14 0.65     2.25   1.04   1.41   0.46   1.85   2.38
   Median     0.70  0.89  0.46  1.70  2.12  0.70        3        0        1        0        2        2 
 
  37 Table 1.A reports the country legal regime variables (INV_PROT1, INV_PROT2, and INV_PROT3) and the company corporate governance indicators (COMM1, COMM2, BEBCHUK, INDEP1, 
INDEP3, and TRANSP). In particular, the country indicators consist of combinations of normalized values from 0 to 1 of the revised LLSV index, the ICRG Law and Order Index and the Anti-Self 
Dealing Index. The company-level governance indicator COMM1 considers the existence of board committees, while COMM2 their independence. BEBCHUK is constructed following the 
entrenchment index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2004). INDEP1 is a dummy equal to 1 if a board consists of a majority of independent directors. In addition to independence, INDEP3 takes into 
account the presence of the former CEO on the board and the separation of the roles between the CEO and the Chairman. TRANSP ranks the degree of potential account manipulation within the 
company. The composition of each index is given in Table 1.B  
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  Table 1.B: INCIDENCE OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS FOR EACH INDICATOR 
 
 








    
  46%      
          













  65%        79% 40%
          
          












  65%        81% 91%
 
 
INDICATOR    Constituents
         








          
          52% 58% 83% 31%
          












          
        26% 37% 40%  
          














          30% 80% 10% 20%
          TABLE 1.C: PERCENTAGES OF CO-EXISTENCE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE PRACTICES FOR THE MAIN INDICATORS 
 
 
This table shows the distribution of the company- year observations in the combination of specific 
corporate governance indicators. For instance, in 553 cases out of 5857 (9.44%), companies have 
COMM1=0 and INV_PROT1 less than the median 1.7.  
 
 
    INV_PROT1      INV_PROT1  
      < 1.7  >= 1.7          < 1.7  >= 1.7  total  
                            
COMM1 = 0  553 297    COMM1 = 0    9.44% 5.07% 15.51% 
                     
COMM1 =1  99 1505    COMM1 =1    1.69% 25.70% 27.39% 
                     
COMM1 = 2  124 201    COMM1 = 2    2.12% 3.43%  5.38% 
                     
COMM1 = 3  264 1080    COMM1 = 3    4.51% 18.44% 22.94% 
                       
COMM1 = 4  1198 536     COMM1 = 4     20.45% 9.15%  29.60% 
                     
  total  2238 3619    total  38.21% 61.79% 100.00% 
                    
                           
BEBCHUK = 0  336 7    BEBCHUK = 0    5.97% 0.12%  6.09% 
                     
BEBCHUK = 1  1047 2255    BEBCHUK = 1    18.60% 40.06%  58.66% 
                     
BEBCHUK = 2  352 1084    BEBCHUK = 2    6.25% 19.26% 25.51% 
                     
BEBCHUK = 3  256 138   BEBCHUK = 3     4.55% 2.45%  7.00% 
                       
BEBCHUK = 4  152 2      BEBCHUK = 4     2.70% 0.04%  2.74% 
                     
  total  2143 3486    total  38.07% 61.93% 100.00% 
                      
                           
INDEP1 = 0  381 2366    INDEP1 = 0    7.46% 46.33% 53.79% 
                     
INDEP1 = 1   1371 989     INDEP1 = 1      26.85%  19.37%  46.21% 
                     
  total  1752 3355    total  34.31% 65.69% 100.00% 
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TABLE 1.D: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FINANCIAL DATA 
 
 
This table gives summary statistics of the financial data use in the analysis. Tobin’s Q and ROA 
(Return on Assets) are the performance variables. Sales (in logarithm), total assets (in logarithm), the 
ratio property-plants-equipments (PPE) to sales, 1 year growth of sales (G_S), the ratio total debt to 
total equity (D_E) and the ratio capital expenditures to sales (CAPEX_SALES) are the control 
variables. ADR is a dummy equal to 1 if a company had traded ADRs, 0 otherwise. Details on how 





Variable Obs.  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.  Min Max 
         
Tobin' s Q  5773 1.66 0.94 0.45 5.76 
ROA  5778 0.06  0.1  -1.08 1.52 
Total Assets ($US) (mill)  5797 10031  28145  5.8 750507 
Sales ($US) (mill)  5797 7940  19246  0  328213 
PPE_SALES  5773 0.64 1.24  0  33.56 
G_S  5857 0.08 0.22 -0.48 1.09 
D_E  5857 1.3 2.95  0  20.42 
CAPEX_SALES  5857 0.1 0.19  0  1.09 
ADR  5857 0.19 0.39  0  1 
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TABLE 2: UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
 
In this table we divide the company-observation in 4 groups: companies with both high (above the 
median) levels of country and company corporate governance (HiHi), companies with high level of 
country investor protection but low (below the median) level of company corporate governance (HiLo) 
and vice-versa (LoHi), and finally companies with both low standards of country and company 
corporate governance (LoLo). We then compute the average Tobin’s Q for each group. The total 
number of observations is in parentheses.  
 
 
   INV_PROT1 HIGH  INV_PROT1 LOW  difference 
        
     HL-LH= -0.61*** 
           
COMM1 HIGH  1.70 2.03  HH-LH= -0.33*** 
  (1587) (1427)    
      
COMM1 LOW  1.42 1.53  HL-LL= -0.10*** 
   (1988) (771)    
       
difference  HH-HL= 0.28***  LH-LL= 0.50***  HH-LL= 0.17*** 
        
     HL-LH= -0.62*** 
           
BEBCHUK 
HIGH  1.57 2.16  HH-LH= -0.59*** 
  (1212) (735)    
      
BEBCHUK 
LOW  1.53 1.69  HL-LL= -0.15*** 
   (2233) (1370)    
       
difference  HH-HL= 0.035 LH-LL=  0.47***  HH- LL= -0.12*** 
        
     HL-LH= -0.61*** 
           
BOARD IND 
YES  1.74 2.07  HH-LH= -0.32*** 
  (976) (1338)    
      
BOARD IND 
NO  1.46 1.56  HL-LL= -0.10** 
   (2336) (374)    
       
difference  HH-HL= 0.28***  LH-LL= 0.50***  HH-LL= 0.17*** 
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TABLE 3: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on a country level index of investor protection 
(INV_PROT1, INV_PROT2, INV_PROT3), company corporate governance indicators (COMM1, COMM2, BEBCHUK, 
INDEP1, INDEP3, and TRANSP), their interaction terms, and various controls (the logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the 
ratio property-plants-equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), and a dummy equal to one if a company has traded ADRs).   
Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, and robust standard error clustered at 
country level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Dependent variable  Tobin's Q 
    I  II III IV V VI  VII  VIII  IX 
INV_PROT1 -0.09  -0.09  0.02  -0.003 -0.07  0.09  0.57*     
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.50) (0.16) (0.31) (0.38) (0.29)     
INV_PROT2            0.54   
            ( 0 . 3 4 )    
INV_PROT3             0.72* 
             ( 0 . 4 0 )  
             
COMM1  0.54***        0.46***  0.46***  0.29*** 
  (0.14)        (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.06) 
C O M M 2       0 . 8 1 * * *          
      ( 0 . 1 0 )          
BEBCHUK       0.75**      0.53***  0.54  0.29*** 
       (0.29)      (0.17)  (0.36)  (0.08) 
INDEP1         2.37***    0.98***  0.71***  0.54*** 
        (0.39)     (0.17)  (0.27)  (0.13) 
INDEP3         0.56***      
         ( 0 . 1 9 )       
TRANSP          0.41***     
          ( 0 . 1 2 )      
             
             
COMM1*  INV_PROT  -0.23***        -0.20**  -0.14*  -0.24** 
  (0.09)        (0.083)  (0.07)  (0.10) 
COMM1*  INV_PROT      -0.38***         
      ( 0 . 1 0 )          
BEBCHUK * INV_PROT       -0.41**        -0.31***  -0.22  -0.41*** 
       (0.18)      (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.14) 
INDEP1 * INV_PROT         -1.16***      -0.46***  -0.21**  -0.49*** 
        (0.20)     (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.15) 
INDEP3  *  INV_PROT        -0.32***      
         ( 0 . 1 1 )       
TRANSP  *  INV_PROT          -0.24***     
          ( 0 . 0 7 )      
             
LOG  SALES  -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.07** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.14*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
PPE_SALES  -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05 -0.06*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
ADR 0.12*  0.14**  -0.002  0.11  -0.05  0.10 0.16** 0.11 0.16** 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
Constant, Industry & Year 
dummies  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Obs.  5749 5749 5526 5002 3419 2997 4854 4854 4854 
Number  of  countries  23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
R  squared  0.23 0.23 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.25 
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TABLE 4: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on 3 dummy variables equal to 1 if a company has high standards of corporate governance at both country and company level (HiHi), or has 
high legal protection at country level but low at the company level (HiLo) (and vice-versa, LoHi), or had both low country and company governance levels (LoLo), 0 otherwise. The group LoHi is dropped as it is 
the reference. INV_PROT1 is the country indicators of legal protection. COMM1, COMM2, BEBCHUK, INDEP1, INDEP3, and TRANSP are the company level governance indicators. The logarithm of sales 
(LOG_SALES), the ratio property-plants-equipments to sales  (PPE_SALES), a dummy equal to one if a company has traded ADRs are the control variables. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The F-Test indicates whether the estimated coefficients are significantly different. 
 
  I II III IV V VI
  
Dependent variable: 
Tobin's Q  COMM1  COMM2  BEBCHUK  INDEP1  INDEP3  TRANSP 
                                    
 
    INV_PROT1 HIGH   HIGH  -0.51***  HIGH                    -0.55*** HIGH -0.68*** =1 -0.52*** HIGH -0.45*** HIGH -0.82***
       (0.12)       (0.08)  (0.13)  
1 β
(0.09)     (0.11)     (0.17) 
  INV_PROT1  HIGH                            LOW -0.72*** LOW -0.79*** LOW -0.73*** =0 -0.76*** LOW -0.46*** LOW -0.80***
       (0.15)        (0.11) (0.13)   (0.13)     (0.14)     (0.16) 
 
    INV_PROT1  LOW                          LOW -0.62*** LOW -0.70*** LOW -0.48*** =0 -0.58*** LOW -0.24*** LOW -0.42***




INV_PROT1 LOW  HIGH  dropped  HIGH  dropped  HIGH  dropped  =1  dropped  HIGH  dropped  HIGH  dropped 
                                   
                                   
  LOG  SALES                         -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.14***
                             (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
  PPE_SALES                        -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
                             (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  ADR                          0.08 0.12** 0.050 0.10 -0.01 0.08
                           (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)
                                
 
Constant, Industry & 
Year dummies                       Y Y Y Y Y Y
  Obs.                       5749 5749 5526 5002 3419 2997
  Number  of  countries                       23 23 23 23 23 23
  R squared (overall)    0.22    0.24                0.20 0.23 0.21 0.25
 
 
                               
  F-test                       p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.48 p<0.01 p=0.71 p=0.65
                          p=0.01 p<0.01 p=0.26 p=0.52 p=0.19 p=0.06
                         
2 1 β β =
3 1 β β =
3 2 β β = p=0.21 p=0.27 p=0.18 p=0.10 p=0.23 p=0.06
 TABLE 5: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE - ROBUSTNESS CHECK 1 - 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on 3 dummy variables equal to 1 if a company has high standards of corporate governance at both country and company level (HiHi), or has 
high legal protection at country level but low at the company level (HiLo) (and vice-versa, LoHi), or had both low country and company governance levels (LoLo), 0 otherwise. The group LoHi is dropped as it is 
the reference. INV_PROT1 is the country indicators of legal protection. COMM1, BEBCHUK, and INDEP1 are the company level governance indicators. The logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio property-
plants-equipments to sales  (PPE_SALES), a dummy equal to one if a company has traded ADRs are the control variables. In columns a. extra control variables are added (sales growth, debt/equity ratio and capital 
expenditures/sales ratio). Columns b. include financial companies. Columns c. use ROA instead of Tobin’s Q as performance variable. Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. The F-Test indicates whether the estimated coefficients are significantly different. 
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                               I.a I.b I.c II.a II.b II.c III.a III.b III.c
         COMM1  Q                  Q ROA     BEBCHUK  Q Q ROA     INDEP1  Q Q ROA
 
    INV_PROT1 HIGH      HIGH  -0.48***  -0.47***  -0.063***    HIGH  -0.65***  -0.67***  -0.074***    =1  -0.50***  -0.50***  -0.070*** 
                                    (0.11) (0.12) (0.02) (0.11) (0.12) (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01)
  INV_PROT1 HIGH      LOW  -0.62***  -0.69***  -0.079***    LOW  -0.68***               -0.70*** -0.082*** =0 -0.72*** -0.73*** -0.085***
1 β
                                    (0.14) (0.15) (0.02) (0.11) (0.13) (0.01) (0.11) (0.12) (0.01)
 
    INV_PROT1 LOW     LOW  -0.58***  -0.59***  -0.065***    LOW  -0.44***                -0.47*** -0.050** =0 -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.069***
2 β
                                   
3 β
(0.11) (0.11) (0.02) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.012)
  INV_PROT1 LOW     HIGH  dropped                          dropped dropped HIGH dropped dropped dropped =1 dropped dropped dropped
                                     
  LOG SALES       -0.11***  -0.10***  0.008**      -0.08***  -0.08***  0.011**      -0.12***  -0.11***  0.005 
                                  (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.02) (0.021) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003)
                                  PPE_SALES   -0.06*** -0.03*** -0.003* -0.05*** -0.036*** -0.002 -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.003**
                                    (0.01) (0.006) (0.001) (0.01) (0.004) (0.002) (0.01) (0.006) (0.001)
                                ADR     0.09 0.04 -0.021** 0.06 0.024 -0.027** 0.11 0.05 -0.018**
                                  (0.07) (0.06) (0.009) (0.08) (0.08) (0.012) (0.07) (0.07) (0.009)
  SALES GROWTH       0.69***           0.74***           0.67***      
         (0.14)           (0.16)           (0.15)      
  DEBT_EQUITY       -0.01**           -0.01***           -0.01**      
         (0.006)           (0.005)           (0.006)      
  CAPEX_SALES       0.12           0.05           0.03      
         (0.15)           (0.26)           (0.26)      
 
Constant, Industry & 
Year dummies                               Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
                              Obs.     5749 6893 5757 5526 6597 5531 5002 5963 5009
  Number of countries       23  23  23      23  23  23      23  23  23 
  R squared (overall)       0.25  0.25  0.19      0.23  0.23  0.18      0.25  0.26  0.22 
 
 
F-test                                    p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.04 p=0.57 p=0.52 p=0.33 p<0.01 p<0.01 p=0.08
                                    p=0.04 p=0.01 p=0.87 p=0.20 p=0.27 p=0.39 p=0.51 p=0.45 p=0.93
                                    p=0.23 p=0.20 p=0.33 p=0.16 p=0.19 p=0.22 p=0.07 p=0.11 p=0.26
2 1 β β =
3 1 β β =
3 2 β β =
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TABLE 6: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE - ROBUSTNESS CHECK 2 -  
 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on 3 dummy variables equal to 1 if a company has high standards of corporate governance at both country and company level (HiHi), or has 
high legal protection at country level but low at the company level (HiLo) (and vice-versa, LoHi), or had both low country and company governance levels (LoLo), 0 otherwise. The group LoHi is dropped as it is 
the reference. INV_PROT2 and INV_PROT3 are the country indicators of legal protection. COMM1, BEBCHUK, and INDEP1 are the company level governance indicators. The logarithm of sales 
(LOG_SALES), the ratio property-plants-equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), and a dummy equal to one if a company has traded ADRs are used as control variables. Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code 
industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, and robust standard error clustered at country level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. The F-Test 
indicates whether the estimated coefficients are significantly different. 
 
  I II III
  
Dependent variable: 
Tobin's Q     COMM1  INV_PROT2                INV_PROT3   BEBCHUK  INV_PROT2 INV_PROT3   INDEP1  INV_PROT2 INV_PROT3
                               
 
    INV_PROT HIGH     HIGH  -0.50***  -0.50***    HIGH            -0.62*** -0.57***   HIGH -0.50*** -0.48***
         (0.13)  (0.12)      (0.16)          (0.17)   (0.10) (0.10)
  INV_PROT HIGH     LOW  -0.73***  -0.72***    LOW            -0.64*** -0.59***   LOW -0.74*** -0.72***
         (0.15)  (0.15)      (0.16)          (0.17)   (0.14) (0.14)
 
    INV_PROT LOW    LOW  -0.61***  -0.62***    LOW              -0.42*** -0.38*** LOW -0.56*** -0.55***
         (0.12)  (0.12)      (0.10)          (0.09)   (0.07) (0.07)
  INV_PROT LOW    HIGH  dropped                    dropped HIGH dropped dropped HIGH dropped Dropped
                             
                               
  LOG SALES      -0.12***  -0.12***      -0.09***           -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.12***
         (0.01)  (0.01)      (0.02)            (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
  PPE_SALES                      -0.06*** -0.06***  -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05***
         (0.01)  (0.01)      (0.01)            (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
  ADR                       0.08  0.08 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.08
         (0.07)  (0.07)      (0.10)            (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
                               
 
Constant, Industry & 
Year dummies                      Y Y Y Y   Y Y
  Obs.                          5749 5749 5526 5526 5002 5002
  Number of countries      23  23      23  23      23  23 
  R squared (overall)      0.22  0.22                  0.20 0.19 0.23 0.23
 
 
                            
  F-test                     p<0.01  p<0.01  p=0.69 p=0.73 p<0.01 p<0.01
                            p=0.01 p<0.01 p=0.27 p=0.28 p=0.44 p=0.32
                            p=0.11 p=0.15 p=0.22 p=0.24 p=0.08 p=0.09
3 1 β β =
3 2 β β =
2 1 β β =
2 β
1 β
3 β  46
TABLE 7: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE - ROBUSTNESS CHECK 3 –  
 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on the country indicator INV_PROT1, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company 
level of governance is above the median (Hi) and 0 otherwise, and their interaction term. COMM1, BEBCHUK, and INDEP1 are the company level 
governance indicators. The logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES), the ratio property-plants-equipments to sales (PPE_SALES), and a dummy equal to one 
if a company has traded ADRs are used as control variables. Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, time fixed effects, and 
robust standard error clustered at country level (in parentheses). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
The F-Test indicates the total country effect for companies with an above the median governance level. 
 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q  I  II  III  IV  V 
            
 
    INV_PROT1   -0.13  -0.23  -0.003  0.005  0.11 
   (0.13)  (0.34)  (0.16) (0.16)  (0.20) 
 
    INV_PROT1 * COMM1 HIGH  -0.91***    -0.80***  -0.35* 
   (0.23)      (0.25)  (0.20) 
  COMM1 HIGH  1.96***      1.76***  0.85** 
   (0.45)      (0.48)  (0.35) 
 
    INV_PROT1 * BEBCHUK HIGH    -0.94*    -0.63***  -0.53*** 
     (0.49)    (0.22)  (0.20) 
  BEBCHUK HIGH    1.72**    1.17***  0.97*** 
 
   
 (0.82)   (0.37)  (0.33) 
  INV_PROT1 * INDEP1      -1.16***    -0.72*** 
       (0.20)    (0.14) 
  INDEP1     2.37***    1.47*** 
       (0.39)    (0.25) 
            
  LOG SALES  -0.11***  -0.07**  -0.12***  -0.11***  -0.13*** 
   (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
  PPE_SALES -0.06***  -0.05***  -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 
   (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
  ADR 0.09  -0.005  0.11 0.11* 0.14** 
   (0.07)  (0.12)  (0.07) (0.06)  (0.06) 
            
  Constant, Industry & Year dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
  Obs. 5749  5526  5002  5526  4854 
  Number of countries  23  23  23  23  23 
  R squared (overall)  0.22 0.18  0.23 0.23  0.24 
            
 
F-test: effect of country investor 




= -1.05***  
 
 







   p<0.01 p=0.06  p<0.01 p<0.01  p=0.06 
       
 
 




        p=0.03  p=0.16 
        
 
= -0. 0*** 6  





2 1 β β + 3 1
 
β β + 4 1 β β + 2 1 β β +
3 1 β β +
3 1 β β +
4 1 β β +
3 1 β β +TABLE 8: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXTERNAL FINANCING DEPENDENCE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on the interaction term between external financing dependence and corporate governance indicators at country (INV_PROT1) and 
company level (COMM1, BEBCHUK, INDEP1), and their interaction (INV_PROT1*COMM1, INV_PROT1*BEBCHUK, INV_PROT1*INDEP1). The logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES) is used as 
control variable. External dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of financial dependence at industrial level for US companies and updated for the year 2000. Regressions are run with 2-




Dependent variable: Tobin's Q  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Interaction (external dependence 
X INV_PROT1)  0.083          
  (0.12)          
Interaction (external dependence 
X COMM1)                  0.035** 0.039**
                  (0.01) (0.02)
Interaction (external dependence 
X INV_PROT1_COMM1)       0.019**            0.021** 
                 (0.008) (0.01)
Interaction (external dependence 
X BEBCHUK)                  0.005 -0.029
                  (0.02) (0.02)
Interaction (external dependence 
X INV_PROT1_ BEBCHUK)           0.006        -0.016 
                 (0.01) (0.01)
Interaction (external dependence 
X INDEP1)                  0.14*** 0.090***
                  (0.042) (0.02)
Interaction (external dependence 
X INV_PROT1_ INDEP1)               0.08***    0.051*** 
                 (0.01) (0.01)
             
LOG  SALES                    -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11***
            (0.01)  (0.018) (0.01)  (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant, Industry & Year 
dummies  Y                  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number  of  countries                    22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Obs.  4571                  4571 4571 4378 4378 3832 3831 3709 3709
R squared (overall)  0.18  0.18  0.18              0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
  47 TABLE 9: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, SIZE AND PERFORMANCE 
 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on the interaction term between the average firm size with respect to  the industry (large firm share) and corporate governance 
indicators at country (INV_PROT1) and company level (COMM1, BEBCHUK, INDEP1), and their interaction (INV_PROT1*COMM1, INV_PROT1*BEBCHUK, INV_PROT1*INDEP1). Large firm 
share is the Beck et al. (2005) industry k’s share of employment in companies with more than 20 employees in the US for the year 2000. The logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES) is used as control variable. 




Dependent variable: Tobin's Q  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX 
Interaction (large firm share X 
INV_PROT1)  0.091             
  (0.13)             
Interaction (large firm share X 
COMM1)     0.068***                0.078***
                 (0.02)    (0.02)
Interaction (large firm share X 
INV_PROT1_COMM1)                  0.036*** 0.040**
                  (0.01) (0.01)
Interaction (large firm share X 
BEBCHUK)                  0.048 0.007
                  (0.03) (0.03)
Interaction (large firm share X 
INV_PROT1_BEBCHUK)                  0.028* -0.002
                  (0.01) (0.01)
Interaction (large firm share X 
INDEP1)                 0.209***    0.115**
                   (0.08)  (0.05)
Interaction (large firm share X 
INV_PROT1_INDEP1)               0.116***    0.067** 
                   (0.04)  (0.03)
                
LOG SALES  -0.09***  -0.10***  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.09***          -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10***
            (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
                
Constant, Industry & Year 
dummies  Y                  Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Number  of  countries                    22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Obs.  4593                  4593 4593 4397 4397 3848 3848 3725 3725
R squared (overall)  0.18  0.18  0.19              0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.20
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TABLE 10: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXTERNAL FINANCING DEPENDENCE, SIZE AND PERFORMANCE 
This tables reports country random effects regressions of Tobin’s Q on the interaction term between external financing dependence or the average firm size with respect to  the industry (large firm share) 
and corporate governance indicators at country (INV_PROT1) and company level (COMM1, BEBCHUK, INDEP1), and their interaction (INV_PROT1*COMM1, INV_PROT1*BEBCHUK, 
INV_PROT1*INDEP1).  External dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure of financial dependence at industrial level for US companies and updated for the year 2000. Large firm share is 
the Beck et al. (2005) industry k’s share of employment in companies with more than 20 employees in the US for the year 2000. The logarithm of sales (LOG_SALES) is used as control variable. 
Regressions are run with 2-digit SIC code industry fixed effects, and robust standard error clustered at country level (in parentheses). The sample of companies is all industries (All) excluded financial, or 
manufacturing industries only (Manu). Significance levels are indicated by *, **, and *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q  I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X  XI  XII 
Interaction  (external  dependence  X  COMM1)                      0.014 0.011
                      (0.01) (0.01)
Interaction (large firm share X COMM1)  0.054***  0.070***                     
                      (0.01) (0.01)
Interaction (external dependence X BEBCHUK)       -0.024  -0.027                 
                        (0.02) (0.03)
Interaction (large firm share X BEBCHUK)       0.072  0.073                 
                        (0.04) (0.04)
Interaction (external dependence X INDEP1)           0.094***  0.087**             
                        (0.02)  (0.04)
Interaction (large firm share X INDEP1)           0.116*  0.238***             
                        (0.06)  (0.07)
Interaction (external dependence X 




(0.01)        
Interaction (large firm share X 




(0.01)        
Interaction (external dependence X 





Interaction (large firm share X 





Interaction (external dependence X 





Interaction (large firm share X 





                       
LOG  SALES                          -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.13***
                          (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Constant,  Industry  &  Year  dummies                          Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industries                          All Manu All Manu All Manu All Manu All Manu All Manu
Number  of  countries                          22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Obs.                          4567 2190 4374 2121 3828 1845 4567 2190 4374 2121 3828 1845
R  squared  (overall)                          0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20
 